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Neither a borrower nor a lender be;
For loan oft loses both itself and friend.
— Hamlet, Act I, Scene 3
1 Introduction
Many policymakers believe that micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), which
are the backbone of most economies, have inadequate access to formal finance.1 This fi-
nancing gap is believed to contribute to the top and bottom heavy firm size distribution
in developing countries, the so-called “missing middle” (International Finance Corporation
(2009)). It has also led to widespread efforts to expand access to formal finance.
While lacking formal finance, smaller firms tap into informal finance. A study of 42
countries by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM)2 estimates that, in 2006, several
million companies received $600 billion from 208 million informal investors (Bygrave and
Quill (2006)).3 Thus informal finance somehow overcomes the frictions that impede formal
finance. This raises a natural question: can informal finance not close the financing gap?
The common view is that informal investors do not have sufficient funds or, for this and
other reasons, require very high returns. In short, supply is limited or costly.4
1According to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2006), MSMEs are
the dominant form of business, accounting for over 95% and up to 99% of enterprises depending on the
country, and for 60 to 70 percent of net job creation in OECD countries.
2The GEM is the largest ongoing study of entrepreneurship in the world.
3By comparison, across all 85 GEM countries, formal venture capitalists invested $37.3 billion into 11,066
companies in 2005, of which 71% was invested in the United States. Informal finance is probably most
important in developing countries. The Global Financial Inclusion Database, which covers 184 countries,
estimates that, in developing countries, currently 59% of adults have no bank account and 55% of borrowers
use only informal sources of credit (Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper, 2012).
4Existing theory reflects this view (see Section 2.1). Models of informal finance typically assume that
informal investors have some technological advantage – such as superior information, cheaper monitoring, or
stricter enforcement – in mitigating moral hazard or adverse selection. Models that feature a choice between
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This paper argues that demand for informal finance is constrained as well. The supply-
side story seems accurate in the case of informal moneylenders, who typically charge enor-
mous interest rates. But it is at odds with aspects that commonly characterize financing
from family and friends—or short, family finance—which constitutes the bulk of informal
finance.5 To begin with, family finance is cheap. In fact, it often has a negative price. As a
Wall Street Journal (2012) guide writes, many startups turn to “the Bank of Mom or Dad”
for a “dream-come-true interest rate.” Indeed, half of all informal investors in the GEM study
expect zero or negative returns (Bygrave, 2004: 17), and family loans among the poor are
predominantly interest-free (Collins et al., 2010: Chapter 2). Family finance, it would seem,
should therefore be a first resort.
But paradoxically, it is not. Borrowers frequently eschew family finance even when it
is cheap. Many poor households state that they dislike borrowing from family and friends,
or that they borrow elsewhere whenever they can (Collins et al., 2010: 54f). In the GEM
study, the largest informal investments involve strangers, not relatives or friends, despite the
fact that the investor’s required return rises with her social distance to the entrepreneur.
As the most likely reason, the study does not cite limited supply of family funds but rather
that “investments in strangers are made in a more detached and business-like manner than
investments in relatives and friends” (Bygrave, 2004: 17). Tellingly, business experts urge
entrepreneurs to “think twice before borrowing from family” and see family finance as “a last
resort, not a first resort” (BusinessWeek, 2006).
formal and informal finance usually assume, in addition, that informal investors are wealth-constrained or
must be compensated for higher costs, thus creating a trade-off that can explain the coexistence of informal
and formal finance.
5The GEM study finds that about four out of five informal investors are either relatives or friends of the
entrepreneur (Bygrave and Quill, 2006: 12). For developing economies, the conclusion that most financial
activity occurs among friends and relatives was already drawn in the 1989 World Development Report (World
Bank, 1989: 112).
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This poses basic questions. Why is family finance so prevalent? Why does it come at
giveaway prices? Why are borrowers nevertheless averse to it? What, if so, is the constraint
on family finance? Building on a moral hazard model of constrained lending similar to
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), this paper argues that a single aspect of family finance offers
a coherent answer to all these questions: relatives or friends are linked by altruism. Clearly,
altruism can explain how family finance overcomes contracting frictions and why family
investors may accept negative returns. But it can also explain why a borrower may dislike
family finance. The borrower may be averse to imposing risk on family and friends, and
more, afraid of repercussions on his relationships to them. Since such concerns increase with
risk, family finance deters the borrower from taking chances, especially large ones. This,
then, curtails the usefulness of family finance for entrepreneurial risk-taking and growth,
and hence its potential to close the financing gap. In other words, altruism, the very bond
that makes family finance a good source of trust capital, also makes it a bad source of risk
capital.
Whether the relevant constraint on family finance is only a lack of supply or, for the
reasons above, also a lack of demand is not just an academic issue; it can matter for policy.
For example, it could inform the design of micro venture capital programs in developing
countries. If our arguments are correct, a micro venture capitalist who wants to harness the
power of social relations must take into account that this can endanger those relations and
mute the entrepreneur’s incentive to take risks. The challenge is then to design a program
that taps the trust embedded in social relations while minimizing the risk imposed on them.
Interestingly, there are firms in developed economies that cite this as their motivation for
intermediating loans between relatives or friends. These intermediaries build on ideas that
could also work for microventure capital funds (see Section 6.1).
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As mentioned, our analysis focuses on altruism between relatives or friends as the key
distinction between family finance and formal finance. For simplicity we assume no other dif-
ferences (for example, in wealth, cost, or information). Notwithstanding, the model produces
a number of predictions, each and every one of which results from the single distinction:
(1) Coexistence: Borrowers use family and formal finance. Some borrowers use both sources
of finance simultaneously.
(2) Negative price: Family lenders may accept negative returns.
(3) Pecking order : Despite being cheap, family finance is the last resort.
(4) Risk-taking : Family finance discourages risk-taking.
(5) Certification: Family finance helps raise formal finance.
(6) Deepening : Family finance can be indispensable for projects with severe agency prob-
lems. Formal finance can be indispensable for risky projects.
(7) Size constraint : Family finance limits firm size.
The basic friction in the workhorse model we build on is that the entrepreneur may reduce his
probability of success in order to enjoy a private benefit. For him not to do so, he must keep a
sufficiently large financial stake in the project. But this limits his pledgeable income, that is,
he can pledge only up to a certain part of the cash flow to a lender without losing his incentive
to properly manage the project. When his pledgeable income is smaller than the repayment
required by the lender, financing is infeasible—the entrepreneur is capital-constrained.
We consider two ways in which altruistic ties can influence the borrowing relationship,
one in which the altruism is invariant throughout, and another in which the altruism can
5
be affected by decisions of the entrepreneur. The two scenarios expose different mechanisms
but yield the same main conclusions.
The first scenario focuses on the fact that close relatives and friends partly internalize
each other’s wellbeing. This has several effects. First, the family lender may accept a re-
payment below her breakeven level because she enjoys helping the entrepreneur. Second,
the entrepreneur is less prone to consume the private benefit because he dislikes harming
the family lender. This increases pledgeable income. Third, the entrepreneur dislikes the
risk he imposes on the family lender. The first two effects—which relax the lender’s partic-
ipation constraint and the entrepreneur’s incentive-compatibility constraint—make it more
likely that the pledgeable income exceeds the required repayment; that is, they relax the
capital constraint. The third effect—which tightens the entrepreneur’s participation con-
straint—makes family finance unattractive in terms of risk sharing, since the entrepreneur
retains risk exposure through his altruism. Thus, in this scenario, family finance manifests
a “social” version of a classic trade-off: it improves incentives at the expense of risk sharing.
The second scenario focuses on the fact that altruistic relationships are valuable beyond
being a source of finance, and that a financial transaction may put this value at risk. While
a financial default per se need not harm the relationship, it may create social obligations,
that is, expectations on part of the family lender that the borrower will somehow make up
for the loss, or one day return the favor. If the lender is denied such favors, the relationship
may suffer. Thus the leniency, or flexibility, of family loans may be a false impression: it
is hard to shake off family “debt.” In other words, family loans seldom come with limited
liability. This has again several effects. First, the observable returns to family loans can be
negative, because of altruism and unobservable means of compensation. Second, a delinquent
entrepreneur faces social frictions—he owes the family lender, possibly costly, favors or he
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risks making her indignant by denying her such favors. Third, the absence of limited liability
and the threat of social frictions make default less appealing and hence reduce the moral
hazard problem; the entrepreneur is less prone to consume the private benefit. In this
scenario family finance embodies another classic trade-off: it improves ex ante incentives at
the risk of ex post frictions.6
The logic common to both scenarios is that, despite being “cheap,” family borrowing is a
costly commitment device. Because of these costs, entrepreneurs prefer only formal finance
unless the additional commitment of family finance is necessary. The costs can even be
so high that the entrepreneur rather forgoes a risky project than finance it through family
and friends, especially if the risk is large. This basic logic underlies predictions (1) to (7)
mentioned above.
If our portrayal of family finance is accurate, it also sheds a different light on the strengths
of formal finance. The promise of formal finance is then not just an increase in the supply
of loanable funds. Formality creates two distinct advantages over family finance: it channels
risk out of the borrower’s social sphere and it is immune to the threat of social frictions.7
Both of these advantages imply that formal finance is better than family finance for borrowers
who seek to fund risky investments, such as those with entrepreneurial ambitions. This, if
true, suggests that it may be worthwhile thinking about loan designs that combine social
incentives and formality in potentially more effective ways.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the concerns outlined in our theory of family finance
are salient in reality. For example, the following advice echoes the kind of altruistic concern
that is key to the first scenario:
6This raises the question why the frictions are not negotiated away ex post. Section 6.2 discusses this
issue and how it relates to commitment.
7A more fundamental interpretation of the second point is that liabilities governed by contract, as opposed
to emotions or norms, can be designed more flexibly. Section 6.2 discusses this point in more detail.
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Family members do things out of love and have been known to take that to an
extreme, offering up more than they truly can afford to. No one ever wants to
put a relative in a bad financial situation. It can be tough to tell the truth of the
matter, but make sure that if you’re borrowing money from a family member, it
won’t cause issues for them.8
Similarly, the next advice mentions the kinds of social frictions that are key to the second
scenario:
The borrower becomes a servant to the lender (Proverbs 22:7). This is exactly
how I felt when I borrowed money. I felt that I had to please my lender and do
everything that he suggested. I felt like I could not oppose this person in any
way . . . If you lend money to a friend or family member, beware that you may
not get your money back and your relationship may never go back to normal.
This will cause tension between you and the borrower, and may also cause guilt,
remorse, and anger.9
Such advice is the rule rather than the exception—which suggests that these issues are
of first-order importance to family finance. Last but not least, Collins et al. (2010: 55)
document that such concerns indeed reduce the demand for family finance:
Somnath from Delhi . . . avoided recourse to relatives at all costs, because he was
ashamed and anxious that, if he couldn’t repay on time, he would strain the rela-
tionship. Similar feelings were voiced by as many as half the Delhi respondents:
they would go to several informal sources (colleagues, neighbors, the grocer, one’s
8See http://moneyning.com/money-beliefs/5-times-you-shouldnt-take-money-from-family, retrieved 16
May 2012.
9See http://www.moneycrashers.com/why-you-should-not-lend-money-to-friends-and-family, retrieved 16
May 2012.
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employer) before they would resort to relatives. Sultan the carpenter explained
this reluctance, telling us that, although he has many relatives living close by
who are in a better financial position than he, he avoids taking money from them.
These relatives provide support out of love and duty, he told us, a kind of social
security. If he took a loan from them and wasn’t able to repay it, he might lose
the social relationship with them, which he valued greatly.
2 Related literature
2.1 Theoretical literature
There is a well-established theoretical literature on the role of social ties in financial con-
tracting. One strand focuses on information advantages: Lower monitoring costs or superior
information on the part of social lenders reduce moral hazard (Stiglitz, 1990; Varian, 1990;
Banerjee et al. ,1994; Jain, 1999), costly state verification (Mookherjee and Png, 1989;
Prescott, 1997; Gine, 2011), and adverse selection (Ghatak, 1999). We abstract from such
information benefits in order to focus on the effects of altruism. In fact, Section 5 assumes
the opposite, namely that formal lenders rely on monitoring whereas family lenders rely
(only) on altruism.
Another strand, which our second model belongs to, argues that social ties—through
the threat of social sanctions in case of default—help enforce repayment. Besley and Coate
(1995) start with a given group of borrowers and show that a repayment game can be designed
such that social sanctions, modeled as a cost to a defaulting borrower, help exact repayment.
Besley et al. (1993) study similar disciplinary benefits of peer pressure. In a recent paper,
Karlan et al. (2009) embed such effects in a social network model where social ties serve as
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social collateral, and show how the network structure influences transactions.
While focusing on how social ties facilitate lending, these papers pay less attention to
the downside of social enforcement. Ghatak and Guinnane (1999: 221) write in their survey
that “the literature on group lending shies away from discussing the possible negative impli-
cations of peer pressure,” citing real-world examples from Montgomery et al. (1996) where
the reliance on social relations for enforcement damaged those relations ex post and even
provoked violence. It is, among other things, such negative implications of family finance
that the present paper focuses on.
Another related literature focuses on family firms. Early influential work in this literature
models the family as a unified entity. In Burkart et al. (2003), family ownership mitigates
conflicts between managers and outside shareholders but creates conflicts between the family
and other stakeholders. In Almeida and Wolfenzon (2007), families use pyramidal business
groups to fund new investments when external finance is difficult to obtain due to agency
problems. These papers parsimoniously model the fact that certain frictions that impede
transactions between strangers are mitigated within the family, but treat the family as a
“black box.” Recently, there have been attempts to study governance issues in settings
where family members do not necessarily act in unison (Lee and Persson, 2011; Noe, 2011).
The broader literature on family economics starts with Becker’s (1973) unitary model
of the household, which treats the family as a single decision maker. Empirical evidence
against a key prediction of this model—namely, that a family’s expenditure decisions are
independent of whom income is endowed upon—has led to the collective model of the house-
hold, which brings individual preferences, conflicts, and bargaining powers to the fore (see
Browning et al., 2012, and the references therein). While stressing family conflicts, the col-
lective model assumes nonetheless that the household always achieves Pareto efficiency. The
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efficiency assumption has been challenged empirically (e.g., Udry, 1996; Duflo and Udry,
2004; Ashraf, 2009; Ashraf et al., 2010); and Schaner, 2012), and several studies propose
alternative household models in which intrafamily conflicts entail inefficiencies (e.g., Konrad
and Lommerud, 1995; Lundberg and Pollak, 2003; Basu, 2006; and Hertzberg, 2012).
Although we also posit that social relations can lead to inefficient outcomes, the per-
spective is rather different: In the first scenario, the Achilles heel is the empathy, not the
conflict, between family members; in the second scenario, family transactions are problem-
atic not because existing conflicts distort decisions, but because the decisions can create
conflict.
2.2 Empirical literature
We are not aware of empirical studies that explicitly test the trade-offs discussed in this
paper. However, there are observations in various empirical studies that speak to some of
our main points.
First, there is evidence that (the success or failure of) financial transactions can affect
social relationships. In the context of group lending, Karlan (2007) reports direct evidence
that the relationships between group members deteriorate after default. Complementing this
finding, Feigenberg et al. (2010) document that group lending can improve social relations
among group members, notwithstanding—we presume—that joint-liability defaults could
still harm these relations.
Second, recent studies indicate that social preferences can create “social risk aversion.”
Saidi (2010) reports evidence suggesting that funding based on social relations leads to less
risky investments. In an experimental study on delegated risk-taking, Andersson et al. (2012)
show that pro-social preferences decrease a subject’s inclination to take risks on behalf of
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others.
Third, there is some empirical indication that, consistent with anecdotal evidence, en-
trepreneurs may prefer formal over family finance. Using the Kauffman Firm Survey, Robb
and Robinson (2012) find that the startups in their sample rely much less on funding from
family and friends than expected, and much more on bank financing. Similarly, using the
World Bank Enterprise Surveys of about 70,000 firms—primarily SMEs—in 104 countries,
Chavis et al. (2010, 2011) find that, while young firms use more family finance than formal
(bank) finance, this financing pattern reverses over time: as the firms age, bank finance
replaces informal finance. This is consistent with our theoretical conclusion that, though
entrepreneurs may sometimes have to rely on family finance, they prefer formal finance,
sometimes even requiring it, when funding risky investments.
Finally, several empirical studies on family firms discuss more generally that family in-
volvement can have a “dark side” (Schulze et al., 2001; Bertrand and Schoar, 2006; Bertrand
et al., 2008). Bertrand and Schoar (2006) report empirical patterns that are consistent with
the idea that “family values” can negatively affect firm value, while the evidence in Bertrand
et al. (2008) strongly suggests that conflicts between multiple heirs damage family firms. An
interesting conjecture in Schulze et al. (2001), which is opposite to the focus in this paper, is
that altruistic ties between family members may soften, rather than strengthen, discipline.10
10Alger and Weibull (2010) theoretically confirm a similar conjecture in a different setting by showing that
altruism can have non-monotonic effects on ex ante incentives because of the incentives to help each other
out ex post.
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3 Social risk
3.1 Model setup
Our basic framework is a variation of the widely used model of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997).
A penniless entrepreneur, A, has a project idea. The project requires a fixed investment I > 0
at time 0. If undertaken, it will yield a verifiable cash flow at time 1, which equals R > 0
(success) with probability q and 0 (failure) otherwise.
A can seek funds from two investors: Investor F is a friend or relative. Investor O is
an outsider who has no social relationship with A. Other than that, the two investors are
identical: risk neutral, equally (un)informed, and endowed with the same wealth W ≥ qR.11
Both only demand to break even, and everyone discounts time at rate 0.
A financial contract promises agent i ∈ {A,F,O} a repayment Ri ≥ 0 in the event of
success, where
￿
i∈{A,F,O}Ri = R. So, if O invests IO, her breakeven condition is qRO = IO.
We sometimes use R ≡ (RA, RF , RO) for convenience.
A is subject to moral hazard. While running the project, he can consume private benefits
in the amount B also with probability q.12 Private benefit extraction comes at the expense of
cash flows reducing them, for simplicity, to 0. We make the following parametric assumption.
A1. qR > max{I, qB}.
This assumption states that the expected cash flow from a well-run project exceeds both the
investment cost and expected private benefits.
11The assumption of risk-neutrality is not crucial. See footnote 13 and Section 6.3.
12We assume that private benefits are uncertain so as to avoid that they are more attractive simply because
they are safer. This is for convenience and not crucial for the results.
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A is risk averse. We model his risk aversion through simple mean-variance preferences:
E[UA(π
s
A)] = E(π
s
A)− ρV ar(πsA),
where the parameter ρ > 0 gauges his risk aversion.
The key aspect of this otherwise standard model is the social relation between A and F.
We model their relationship as mutual altruism. Specifically, we assume that their altruistic
payoffs are
πsi = πi + φπj ￿=i for i ∈ {A,F} ,
where φ ∈ (0, 1) is the degree of altruism.13
3.2 Social risk aversion
It is instructive to first compare the two sources of finance in the absence of moral hazard,
since this allows us to isolate the facet of altruism that is central to our main insights.
Let us begin with funding from only O. Suppose A pledges the entire cash flow to O, that
is, RO = R. For this, O pays A the amount qR at time 0. A’s expected utility E[UA(πsA)|R]
is then
E[UA(π
s
A)|0, 0, R] = qR− I + φW, (1)
where qR is cash received from O and φW is A’s utility from internalizing F ’s payoff. Note
that the risk is optimally allocated; it is fully borne by the risk neutral party, O.
Let us now bring in F , who is risk-neutral like O. Suppose A pledges some cash flow
13We model altruism in terms of payoffs as opposed to utilities out of convenience. Intuitively, in this case,
A may worry over F even if F is not worried herself. This modeling choice is not crucial for the results;
as we discuss in Section 6.3, we could alternatively assume that A and F internalize each other’s utilities,
which yields similar results so long as F is risk averse.
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to F , that is, RF ∈ (0, R]. For this, F pays A the amount IF that meets her breakeven
constraint:
W − IF + qRF + φ (IF + qRO − I) = W + φ (qR− I) . (2)
The left-hand side of (2) is F ’s expected utility if she provides funds; W − IF is residual
cash, qRF is expected cash flow from the project, and φ(IF + qRO − I) is the utility from
internalizing A’s payoff. The right-hand side of (2) is F ’s expected utility if the funding
is left entirely to O; F keeps all her cash W and enjoys utility φqR from internalizing A’s
payoff. This yields
IF = qRF . (3)
A’s expected utility is E[UA(πsA)|0, RF , RO] = qRO + IF − I + φ (W − IF + qRF ) − ρq(1 −
q)φ2R2F , which by way of (3) collapses to
E[UA(π
s
A)|0, RF , RO] = qR− I + φW − ρq(1− q)φ2R2F , (4)
where qR is the total cash from F and O, φW is the utility from internalizing F ’s expected
payoff, and −ρq(1− q)φ2R2F is the disutility from internalizing F ’s risk.
Comparing (4) and (1) leads to our first result.
Lemma 1. Absent private benefit consumption, A is financed only by O.
Key to Lemma 1 is the last term in (4), −ρq(1 − q)φ2R2F , which embodies the cost of a
financial contract between A and F , with q(1− q)R2F being the risk A transfers to F . Since
A and F are friends, A internalizes this risk with intensity φ2, and since he dislikes risk with
intensity ρ, he experiences disutility from shifting risk to F . He feels no such disutility when
transferring risk to O, to whom he is indifferent.
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In common language, the disutility means that A worries about F. Thus, from A’s point
of view, selling the project to F is an imperfect risk transfer: He still worries about the
outcome. This intuition also shines through in the comparative statics.
Corollary 1. A’s preference for funding from O increases with ρ, φ, and q(1− q)R2F .
A finds financing from F less attractive, the greater his risk aversion ρ, the stronger his
altruism φ toward F , and the larger the project risk q(1− q)R2F .
It may seem surprising that φ has no countervailing positive effect, for two reasons. First,
F requires breaking even in monetary terms—just like O—but one might have thought her
willing to provide funds at (more) attractive terms since she cares for A. This would be true
if A were to forgo the project without funding from F , but here A can realize the project
without F , who is happy for A even if she is not involved.
Second, one might have thought that A would prefer to “share” the project with a friend
rather than a stranger, due to the altruistic utility. Indeed, if A had to give away profits, he
would rather give them to F. But here A enters into a quid pro quo. As much as he would
enjoy giving F the expected cash flow qRF , he would dislike reducing her cash by IF = qRF .
These effects cancel each other, and what remains is that A imposes risk on F .
3.3 Social incentives and risk aversion
Once there is moral hazard, A may be unable to fund the project solely through O and may
have to raise capital from F. First, consider A’s expected utility
E[UA(π
s
A)|R] = qR− I + φW − ρq(1− q) (RA + φRF )2 (5)
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for a general claim structure R when the project is run well. This equals his expected utility
under the first-best outcome (1) minus ρq(1 − q) (RA − φRF )2, his disutility from exposure
to risk both directly and indirectly through F . Clearly, A would like to increase RO, that
is, transfer (more) risk to O. However, this would also increase his incentives to consume
private benefits.
This brings us to A’s incentive compatibility constraint,
q (RA + φRF )− ρq(1− q) (RA + φRF )2 ≥ qB − ρq(1− q)B2. (6)
The left-hand side of (6) is A’s expected utility from a well-run project; it comprises utility
from his own and F ￿s expected cash flow, q (RA + φRF ), and disutility from his own and F ’s
exposure to risk, −ρq(1 − q) (RA + φRF )2. The right-hand side of (6) shows his expected
utility if he decides to consume private benefits.
Since A wants to maximize RO, he chooses RA and RF just large enough for (6) to be
binding. The resulting quadratic equation yields
RA + φRF = B. (7)
A larger RF relaxes A’s incentive compatibility constraint inasmuch as it allows him to retain
a smaller RA. This is the incentive benefit of financing from F relative to financing from O.
To determine whether A would rather sell risk to F than retain it, we plug (7) into (5),
which consequently collapses to
E[UA(π
s
A)|RA, 0, B −RA] = qR− I + φW − ρq(1− q)B2. (8)
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Strikingly, this implies that A does not care whether the incentive compatibility constraint
is met by allocating risk to himself or to F . We see in (7) that RF is an imperfect substitute
for RA in that a one-dollar claim given up by A requires a 1/φ-dollar claim taken up by F to
preserve A’s incentives. Intuitively, since A cares less about risk borne by F than by himself,
commensurately more risk needs to be borne by F to equally motivate A. Thus, one way or
another, A internalizes the same amount of risk to have proper incentives.
We can compare the situation represented by (8) with A’s situation in the absence of O
to assess the latter’s importance for project funding. Absent O, the project is forgone unless
F funds it fully. Assuming IF ≥ I, F ’s breakeven constraint then becomes
W − IF + qRF + φ [IF − I + q(R−RF )] = W (9)
which yields qRF = IF−φ(IF−I+qR)1−φ . It is straightforward to verify that this is smaller than IF ,
which means that F is willing to accept a negative return when she is pivotal for realizing
the project. The reason is that she partly internalizes benefits accruing to A that would not
materialize without her funding ; she likes to help A out. The lower “cost of capital”—lower
RF and hence larger RA = R − RF—further relaxes A’s incentive-compatibility constraint.
In spite of this, formal finance may be indispensable for A to undertake the project.
Proposition 1. There exist projects that A only undertakes if O is present.
Proof. If only F is present, the upper bound on A’s expected utility is Z ≡ (1+φ) (qR− I)+
φW − ρq(1− q)φ2R2. This is his expected utility when transferring all the risk to F , which
he may not be able to do for incentive reasons. By contrast, if O is also present, A may be
able to fund the project with the help of F and O, in which case his utility is given by (8)
where B < R; let Z ￿ denote this utility. There exist parameters consistent with A1 such that
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Z < 0 < Z ￿ (e.g., choose ρq(1− q)R2 large enough so that Z < 0, and then let B → 0).
As spotlighted by Lemma 1, A dislikes exposing not only himself but also F to risk. In
the absence O, A may hence prefer forgoing the project over putting the risk on himself
or F , even though F is willing to accept a negative expected return, that is, subsidize the
project. By contrast, once O is present, A may dare undertake the project since some risk
can be put outside of his social sphere by funding it through O.
At the same time, not all projects can be funded solely through O. In the absence of F ,
A needs to retain a claim RA = B to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint (see (7)).
However, the residual claim RO = R− B may be too small to raise the required outlay I.
Proposition 2. There exist projects that A only undertakes if F is present.
Proof. Absent F, A can finance the project if and only if q(R − B) ≥ I, or qR ≥ I + qB.
Clearly, there are parameters consistent with A1 that violate this condition. If the condition
is violated, F is necessary to fund at least part of the project. Now suppose F is also present.
F ’s participation constraint is thenW−(1 + φ) IF+qRF+φ (qRO − I) = W. Compared with
(2), the only difference is that the right-hand side is smaller; thus, the break-even rate IF is
larger than in the case of (2): IF = qRF+ε where ε > 0. From O and F together, A can hence
raise qRF +ε+q (R−RF −RA). After substituting for RA using the incentive-compatibility
constraint (7), this becomes qRF + ε + q (R−RF − (B − φRF )) = ε + q (R− B + φRF ) >
q(R− B).
The intuition is that A may be unable to obtain enough capital from O without losing the
incentive to run the project well. In comparison, selling claims to F also yields capital but
reduces A’s incentives less. That is, A can sell more claims—or “pledge more income”—to F
than to O without destroying his incentives. Furthermore, when F is pivotal, she is willing
19
to provide funds below the breakeven rate, making it even easier for A to raise the necessary
funds. As a result, there are projects he can finance only with F ’s participation.
Taken together, Propositions 1 and 2 state that formal finance (funding from O) and
family finance (funding from F ) both promote financial deepening, that is, expand the
capital market. The reason is that they relax two different constraints: The former facilitates
investment when risk aversion sets the binding constraint, whereas the latter fulfills that role
when incentives set the binding constraint. In a nutshell, formal finance is a source of risk
capital, whereas family finance is a source of trust capital.
A simple way to understand this result is to view it as a permutation of the classic trade-off
between risk sharing and incentive provision, but with a social twist. Family finance is better
for incentives but worse for risk sharing than formal finance. The optimal contract taps both
sources for the right balance between risk sharing and incentives.
Proposition 3. If the project is funded, A sells only so much cash flow to F that his incentive
compatibility constraint binds and sells the remaining cash flow to O.
Proof. First, consider funding the project without O. This is possible if there exists some
R = (RA, R−RA, 0) such that the incentive compatibility constraint RA+ φ (R−RA) ≥ B
is satisfied. If no such capital structure exists, the project cannot be funded due to incentive
reasons; selling claims to O would but weaken incentives further. If such a capital structure
exists and the constraint binds, the project is fully funded by F for Z > 0, and abandoned
otherwise (Z is defined in the proof of Proposition 1). If the constraint is slack, A can
raise his expected utility by selling claims to O until the constraint binds. He undertakes
the project, at that point, with funding from O and F if and only if his expected utility is
positive.
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Recall that A, eager to shed risk, wants to raise funding only from O but may not be
able to due to moral hazard. He must then raise some funding through F to preserve his
incentives but, conditional thereupon, still sells as much cash flow as possible to O. That is,
A uses family finance as a commitment device, but only to the extent necessary since it is
costly in terms of risk sharing. With a more continuous choice on the part of A, there would
also be a more continuous trade-off between more risk sharing and better incentives.
Note that the two sources of finance can be complementary in that one may not be
used without the other: A may not ask F for funding unless he can shift some risk to O;
conversely, A may not receive funding from O without funding from F. This second point is,
in a more nuanced way, also reflected in the next result.
Corollary 2. If the project is funded by O and F, RO increases in φ.
Proof. For larger φ, the incentive compatibility constraint RA + φRF ≥ B has more slack.
A can then sell more risk to O, which he wants, without losing his incentives.
Somewhat counterintuitively, closer ties to F make A raise more funding from O, since
less funding from F suffices to obtain (more) funding from O. On the surface, variation in φ
makes the two sources of finance appear like substitutes in our model. This is partly due to
the binary nature of the actions. The complementarity would be more apparent in a model
with a choice of project size or a continuous choice of private benefits, where a larger φ could
lead to more formal finance and family finance.
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4 Social debt
4.1 Model setup
We cast our second model in the same framework with but a few modifications. First, we
dispense with risk aversion to throw out the channel studied above. A is now, like F and O,
risk neutral.
Instead, we extend the timeline to capture the following idea: There exists a reciprocity
norm between A and F such that if A defaults on a loan from F, F expects favors from
A. Such favors can include many things from mowing lawns, running errands, organizing or
attending social events, repaying the “old debt” instead of taking a fancy trip, to giving a
loan in return. If A refuses such favors, F is indignant, and their relationship suffers.
More specifically, we add a time 2 at which A can pay F a favor. The favor imposes a
cost C on A and confers a benefit G on F . If A defaults and declines F the favor, then φ
drops to 0. We make the following parametric assumption:
A2. C = aG > G = RF > φC.
This assumption says two things: First, effects on the relationship aside, the favor is ineffi-
cient (since C > G) but attractive to F (since G > φC). Thus, the favor will not be paid
absent a default, but when paid, will benefit F . Second, larger defaults call for commensu-
rately larger favors (G = RF ).
Crucially, we assume that decisions on future favors are non-contractible and that dam-
ages to relations can occur even when they are ex post inefficient. We have in mind that
relatives or friends tend to base entitlements on personal promises rather than the letter of
the contract, and that a willful breach of such promises evokes emotional reactions, such as
disappointment or indignation, that are impossible to contract (away). We will return to
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these assumptions in Section 6.2 to discuss their importance and back them with insights
from social psychology.
4.2 Social frictions
Again, to clarify the forces at work, we first abstract from private benefit consumption,
which allows us to focus on repercussions for “life after the project.” In this setting, we start
with an informal contract between A and F and discuss the effects of introducing formal
contracts and O. So, as a starting point, suppose there are no formal contracts; that is, there
is no legal enforcement. In this case, O would not be repaid and hence refuses to finance
A. However, F may still supply funds since she may be able to rely on social incentives for
repayment.
These incentives stem from the threat of losing F as a friend if A can repay F but
refuses. Note that A prefers paying F in money to paying favors because the favors are
costlier (C > RF ). Hence, if A refuses to repay the loan in money, he will a fortiori refuse
to pay the favor. Suppose A has the money to repay F . He does so if and only if
φ(W − I +RF ) ≥ RF , (10)
that is, if the relationship is worth more to him than the money he gives up. In other words,
he repays F if his social collateral φ(W −I+RF ) is sufficiently valuable.14 If (10) is violated,
F will not fund the project; she would lose money as well as a friend. This is, for example,
the case when W − I → 0. Importantly, the looming loss of friendship can be pivotal, since
there are cases in which a mere loss of money would not be reason enough for F to deny
14Repayment hinges on the fragility of the friendship. Fixed altruism cannot exact repayment for φ < 1.
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funding.15 This is one example—others will follow—of the central insight of this model: The
threat of social frictions deters financial transactions between friends.
With this thought in mind, let us introduce formal contracts. Under a formal contract,
A repays F at time 1, if he can, even when (10) is violated. But this does not imply that he
always can. Nor does it imply that, in case of default, he would pay F the favor, since even
if (10) holds, the inequality
φ(W − I +RF ) ≥ C (11)
need not hold given that C > RF . Thus, there are two cases. First, suppose (11) is violated.
F ’s breakeven constraint is then
W − I + q [R￿F + φ (R−R￿F )] + (1− q) 0 = W, (12)
which yields R￿F =
I/q−φR
1−φ . It is straightforward to verify that this is smaller than I/q, which
means that F is willing to accept a negative interest rate out of altruism. Now, suppose (11)
holds. In which case, A will pay F the favor after a default, so F ’s breakeven constraint is
W − I + q [R￿￿F + φ (R−R￿￿F )] + (1− q) (G− φC) = W (13)
and yields R￿￿F =
I−qφR
q(1−φ)+(1−q)(1−φa) . Since the favor is de facto a deferred payment that F
receives in case of default, we have R￿￿F < RF . That is, F is willing to accept, at least
nominally, an even more negative financial return in this case.
Formality helps not only enforce monetary transfers but also prevent social frictions.
More specifically, when (10) is violated, a formal contract reduces the probability of so-
15If the relationship is invariant, F ’s participation constraint isW ≤W −I+φqR, simplifying to I ≤ φqR.
That is, F will still provide funding as long as she values the gain to A more than her monetary loss.
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cial frictions by q. But it cannot eliminate them completely. With probability 1 − q,
A will still have to pay F favors, or else damage the relationship; and due to these so-
cial frictions, A might still forgo the project. If (11) is violated, A’s expected gain is
q [R−R￿F + φ (W − I +R￿F )]− φW , which can be written as
qR− I + qφ(R− I)− (1− q)φW. (14)
Otherwise, it is q [R−R￿￿F + φ (W − I +R￿￿F )]+(1− q) [φ(W − I +G)− C]−φW, which can
be written as
qR− I − (1− q)(C −G). (15)
Note that (14) is negative if A finds the threat of losing a friend, (1 − q)φW , too costly.
Similarly, (15) is negative if A deems the expected burden of future favors, (1− q)(C −G),
too large. These are further cases in which the threat of social frictions outweighs the
monetary prospects.
Last but not least, let us introduce O. A formal contract with O is always feasible: A
can raise I from O and repay RO = I/q if the project is successful. This satisfies O’s
breakeven constraint and A’s participation constraint. Moreover, A’s expected profit in this
case, qR− I, is strictly larger than (14) or (15) because there is not threat of social frictions.
Lemma 2. Absent private benefit consumption, A funds the entire project through O.
The advantage of funding the project through O is that A neither risks a friendship nor
fears future social obligations. In short, he sidesteps social frictions.
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4.3 Social incentives and frictions
When private benefit consumption is possible, the contract must also preserve A’s incentives
to run the project well, whatever the funding source. Given this additional constraint, A
can fund the entire project through O only if
qR ≥ I +B. (16)
When (16) is satisfied, any (efficient) project is financed.
As in our analysis of the social risk model, we can compare the situation represented by
(16) with A’s situation in the absence of formal contracting or O to assess the importance
of (each of) the latter.
Proposition 4. There exist projects that A only undertakes if formal contracts are available,
and some that he only undertakes if O is present as well.
Proof. Let (16) hold and (10) be violated. Without formal contracting, we show above that
the project is not undertaken if (10) is violated. Now suppose formal contracting is available
but O is still absent. Irrespective of (10), the project is then financed if A’s participation
constraint, either (14) or (15), is positive and, furthermore, his incentive compatibility con-
straint is satisfied. Depending on which case applies, the incentive compatibility constraint
is either q [R−R￿F + φ (W − I +R￿F )] ≥ B or q [R−R￿￿F + φ (W − I +R￿￿F )]+(1−q)[φ(W −
I + G) − C] ≥ B + φ(W − I + G) − C. After substituting R￿F and R￿￿F , respectively, these
two conditions can be rearranged to qR ≥ I+B−φ(W−I)1+φ and qR ≥ I+B−q(C−φG)−(1−q)(G−φC)1+φ ,
either of which is implied by (16) given A2. Now note that there exist parameters consis-
tent with A1 and A2 such that (16) holds but (14) and (15) are negative. (To see this, let
(1 − q)φW → ∞ and (1 − q)(C − G) → ∞.) For such parameters, F alone does not fund
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the project even with formal contracting. Finally, introduce O. Given (16), all (efficient)
projects are now financed.
Proposition 4 adapts Lemma 2 to the setting with moral hazard: As long as A does
not (have the incentives to) consume private benefits, it is efficient to finance the entire
project through O. By contrast, financing from F can produce social frictions that formal
contracting as well as the presence of O, an unrelated investor, help avoid.
Of course, (16) need not hold; when it is violated, O will refuse to finance the project
(alone) due to moral hazard. Financing from F mitigates such incentive problems and can
therefore be crucial to project funding in such cases.
Proposition 5. There exist projects that A undertakes only if F is present.
Proof. Let (11) hold but (16) be violated. In this case, A alone does not finance the project.
However, F alone would finance the project if (15) is positive and the incentive compatibility
constraint qR ≥ I+B−q(C−φG)−(1−q)(G−φC)1+φ holds. There are parameters consistent with A1
and A2 such that this incentive compatibility constraint and (11) hold, (15) is positive, and
(16) is violated. (To see this, let W → ∞ to satisfy (11), qR − I − B → 0− to violate (16)
but satisfy incentive compatibility, and C −G→ 0 to ensure that (15) is positive.)
Proposition 5 highlights the fact that social frictions can improve matters. The threat
of losing F ’s friendship, or social collateral, strengthens incentives via two channels. First,
it exacts repayments formal contracts cannot enforce. This de facto reduces limited liabil-
ity, thereby raising incentives and pledgeable income. Second, it increases A’s incentives
to succeed because a failure provokes social frictions, in the form of social obligations or
damaged relations. In any case, it is precisely the cost of family finance—the threat of social
frictions—that improves the ex ante incentives.
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Propositions 4 and 5 exhibit parallels to Propositions 1 and 2 in Section 3. On one hand,
formal finance facilitates investment by reducing risk, though here it is the risk of social
frictions. On the other hand, family finance facilitates investment by improving incentives.
Thus, again, formal finance is a source of risk capital, whereas family finance a source of
trust capital.
This is a “social” version of the trade-off between ex ante and ex post efficiency often seen
in incomplete-contract models of financial contracting (e.g., Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990).
Family finance improves commitment “today” at the risk of frictions “tomorrow;” in fact, the
frictions engender the commitment. This trade-off sometimes has an interior solution: It
can be optimal to use some but not only family finance to create the right incentives with
minimal social frictions.
Proposition 6. If the project is funded, it is optimal for A to sell cash flow to O as long as
it reduces social frictions and the incentive compatibility constraint binds.
Proof. Let IF denote the amount raised from F . Note that the smaller IF , the smaller is
RF . Condition (11) can then be written as φ(W − IF ) ≥ (a − φ)RF . This is less likely
to be violated for smaller IF and RF , since a > 1 ≥ φ. Moreover, A’s expected gain from
financing the project when (11) is satisfied becomes qR − I − (1 − q)(a − 1)RF , which is
decreasing in RF . Thus, A benefits from reducing IF if it helps satisfy (11), or if (11) is
already satisfied. If (11) cannot be met, then reducing IF does not reduce social frictions,
and hence does not benefit A. Last, when full financing from O is feasible, F ’s breakeven
constraint yields either R￿F =
φ(R−IF/q)+IF/q−φR
1−φ or R
￿￿
F =
φ(R−IF/q)+IF/q−(1−q)G￿/q−φR
1−φ . In either
case, it is straightforward to verify that A’s expected gain from getting (partly) funded by
F is then negative.
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This also means that A prefers to fund the project entirely through O if possible. Intu-
itively, when F is non-pivotal for financing the project, she offers neither favorable rates nor
incentive benefits; at the same time, involving her would still bring about the risk of social
frictions.
The ability to raise funding from F and O in tandem can be critical. When sole formal
finance violates A’s incentive compatibility constraint and sole family finance violates A’s
participation constraint, financing the project through both F and O can help simultaneously
satisfy incentive compatibility and reduce the threat of social frictions to a level that is
acceptable to A.
5 The “missing middle”
This section studies capital constraints that arise when entrepreneurs can request funding
from either family and friends or formal banks that possess a costly technology to monitor
borrowers. We then show how a combination of the two funding sources relaxes these capital
constraints.
5.1 Distribution of projects and monitored finance
Consider a population of entrepreneurs that differ in the size I ∈ (0,∞) of their project (one
can, e.g., think of them as entrepreneurs with different growth opportunities). A project
of size I yields the expected cash flow qR(I). We make the following assumption about
technology.
A3. R￿(I) > 0.
This assumption says that returns to scale are positive (but not necessarily increasing).
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To ensure that the moral hazard problem does not disappear with project size, we further
assume that A’s private benefits, B(I), are increasing in size. More specifically, we make the
following assumption about the severity of the moral hazard problem.
A4. q
￿
R(I)− Iq
￿
− I < B(I) for all I ∈ (0,∞).
This assumption effectively says that, irrespective of project size, O cannot fund a project
without some means of disciplining A. (Projects that are not subject to A4 would not be
capital-constrained.)
Unlike before, O has access to costly monitoring technology she can use to reduce private
benefit consumption. For simplicity, we assume that she can eradicate private benefits at cost
M. That the cost is independent of I is meant to capture fixed costs of monitoring. Adding
variable costs does not affect the results so long as they do not increase too quickly with
size. The only condition we need is for monitoring larger loans to be cheaper per dollar.16
5.2 Size and social risk aversion
Suppose each entrepreneur’s financial environment in this economy is described by the social
risk model in Section 3. First, let us determine which entrepreneurs can and would raise only
family finance (funding from their respective F s). We know that an entrepreneur’s expected
utility gain, if reliant on family finance, from the project is Z −φW = (1+φ) (qR(I)− I)−
φρq(1− q)R(I)2 (see the proof of Proposition 1). The derivative with respect to I is
∂(Z − φW )
∂I
= R￿(I) [(1 + φ)q − φρq(1− q)2R(I)]− (1 + φ)
16Note that we endow the formal lender with an informational advantage over the informal lender, contrary
to what other models often assume about the differences between formal and informal lenders.
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Given R￿(I) > 0, this term is negative for all I above a threshold. As a result, there exists
some I¯F ∈ (0,∞) such that Z − φW < 0 for all I > I¯F , that is, a size above which A is
unwilling to fund the project through F alone.
Now consider the case of only formal finance. For O to be willing to be the sole financier,
she must find it profitable to monitor the project. She does if qRO ≥M and, conditional on
monitoring, she breaks even if qRO = I +M. This requires RO = (I +M) /q. Consequently,
there exists some size IO > 0, defined by R(IO) = (I +M)/q, such that O is willing to fund
the project alone if and only if I > IO.
When I¯F < IO—which is, for example, the case for sufficiently large M and ρ—having
to choose between the two sources of finance causes firms in the “middle” of the population
to be capital constrained (see Figure 1).
Figure 1
There is a simple intuition as to why formal finance requires a lower bound on project
size whereas family finance imposes an upper bound. Formal finance relies on monitoring
technology that exhibits fixed costs and therefore economies of scale. Monitoring the project
is worthwhile only if the involved cash flows are sufficiently large. The lower bound on
project size thus increases in the fixed cost M. By contrast, the cost of family finance is that
O internalizes the risk that F bears. Thus, when deciding whether to take funding from F,
it is as if A makes a portfolio decision: whether to invest only in a safe asset that yields φW
(i.e., preserving F ￿s wealth) or to invest part in a risky asset (i.e., risking part of F ’s wealth
on the project). The larger the project, the larger the share A would need to “invest in the
risky asset”—if it is too large, he prefers the safe option. For this reason, the upper bound
on project size increases in the risk aversion parameter ρ; the more risk averse A is, the less
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risk he is willing to impose on his friend F.17
Finally, as in Section 3, combining family finance and formal finance relaxes capital
constraints. Consider a project size Iˆ =I¯F + ￿, where ￿ > 0 is infinitesimal. While A’s par-
ticipation constraint is violated under family finance, his incentive compatibility constraint
may hold with slack. If so, A can transfer part of the cash flow to O without destroying
his incentives to run the project well. With enough slack, he can transfer enough to meet
his participation constraint, and without monitoring because the presence of family finance
ensures proper incentives.
5.3 Size and social frictions
Now suppose the entrepreneurs’ financial environment is described by the social debt model
in Section 4. Both of the social frictions in this model increase with project size: The
expected favor in case of a default increases with the amount laid out by F . This not only
imposes greater costs on A if he pays F the favor. It also makes A more prone to deny F the
favor, and thus makes the relationship more prone to harm. Thus, larger projects provoke
greater social frictions.
Figure 2
To illustrate this in the simplest manner, we focus on a very stark comparison, namely,
that between family finance without formal contracting and formal finance. In the absence
of formal contracts, family finance is not feasible unless condition (10) can be satisfied, which
17In our model, we cannot vary the variance of the project cash flow independent of its mean. It is intuitive,
though, that, if possible, the upper bound on project size would increase in that variance, which would mean
that A will be less willing to fund a project of a certain size through F if, all else being equal, the cash flow
risk is larger.
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can be rewritten as
φ
1− φ(W − I) ≥ RF . (17)
We consider the lowest possible RF , namely, the required repayment if A were to pay F the
favor after a default—in doing so, we are conservative in deriving a condition under which
family finance is infeasible. This repayment is R￿￿F as derived from the breakeven constraint
(13). Substituting R￿￿F for RF in (17) yields
φ
1− φ(W − I) ≥
I − qφR
q (1− φ) + (1− q)(1− φa) . (18)
For I → ∞, the left-hand side of this inequality goes to −∞, whereas the right-hand side
goes to +∞. Thus, there exists a threshold value I¯ ￿F such that (18) is violated for all I > I¯ ￿F .
In other words, I¯ ￿F is an upper bound on project size imposed by family finance. By contrast,
formal (monitored) finance requires a minimum project size IO, as defined in Section 5.2 (see
Figure 2).
As before, the lower bound on project size under formal finance stems from the fixed cost
of monitoring; however, the reason for the upper bound on project size under family finance
is now different. When the financial stakes are high, it is no longer certain that a transaction
(even) between friends will be concluded frictionlessly. The temptation to prioritize financial
gains over friendship becomes stronger, which can lead to broken promises and relationships.
This puts a limit on the stakes that the friendship can support in the transaction.
Again, combining formal finance and family finance can improve matters. As discussed in
Section 4, A could seek IF < I¯ ￿F in funding from F, just enough to satisfy (17). This would
reduce the amount of money that must be raised from O, possibly so much so that A’s
incentive compatibility constraint holds. If so, A can fund projects larger than I¯ ￿F without
33
having to compensate O for monitoring costs.
6 Discussion
6.1 Microventure capital
The quote from Collins et al. (2010) in the introduction illustrates that demand-side con-
straints play a role in practice; there are borrowers that eschew family finance for fear of
social frictions, and such behavior is by no means anomalous. At the same time, Collins
et al. (2010) find that “the most important providers of loans are not moneylenders but
friends and neighbors” (14). Indeed, “almost every household borrowed informally from fam-
ily and friends” though many of the households report that “they found informal transactions
unpleasant but unavoidable” (16).
A central finding of the above study is that the poor use financing primarily to ensure
dependable cash flows and to manage risks, because their overarching concern is uncertainty
(18):
The households . . . live lives that are far more uncertain than those in better-off
circumstances. [They] are, as a group, less healthy, live in neighborhoods with
weaker security, and face income volatility tied to the swings of local supply and
demand, no matter whether they are employed or self-employed or are small-scale
entrepreneurs . . . most adults in poor households . . . experience occasional or
chronic anxiety about these risks, and seek to mitigate them in every way they
can, including managing their money.
One way the poor deal with the risks they (already) face and the anxiety is to be conservative;
34
that is, they take few risks.18 In light of our theory, this should be true with respect to not
only one’s own money but also money from family and friends, because they face the same
harsh reality and a default can seriously harm them as well as the borrower’s relationship to
them. If so, family finance primarily serves safe purposes, or as insurance rather than risk
capital. Indeed, ample empirical evidence shows that intra-family transfers among the poor
help smooth consumption (e.g., Udry, 1996) and provide insurance (Ambrus et al., 2010),
quite the opposite of providing funds to take on risky ventures.
Similar observations have been made about microfinance. Recent evidence suggests that
microloans designated as commercial loans are commonly used for safe business purposes,
such as working capital rather than capital expenditure, or non-business purposes, such as
consumption smoothing (e.g., Collins et al., 2011: 47). That is, microloans seldom fund
entrepreneurial risk-taking. Part of the explanation is that microfinance lending is typically
designed to minimize default, that is, they often make “zero default” imperative (Banerjee
and Duflo, 2010: Chapter 6). For our discussion, it is instructive to consider joint-liability
group lending. The original idea behind joint-liability loans is that the group members,
through social pressure, induce each other to repay their loans. While this increases the
incentives to repay, it also induces risk-avoidance: group members will be reluctant to take
risks lest they could default and harvest the anger of the other group members. As Ghatak
and Guinnane (1999: 225) write,
When things go wrong, such as when an entire group is denied future loans,
bitterness and recrimination among group members may have far-reaching con-
sequences for village life. This risk is inherent in the system and needs to be
viewed as a potential cost.
18Banerjee and Duflo (2010) emphasize this point and provide an example of how such conservatism can
deter the adoption of productivity-enhancing technology.
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Such potential costs, as intended, discourage default. But intolerance of default is antithet-
ical to providing risk capital. After assessing this and similar caveats of microfinance that
deter risk-taking, Banerjee and Duflo (2010: 181) conclude that “finding ways to finance
medium-scale enterprises is the next big challenge for finance in developing countries.”19
Our analysis suggests that microfinance programs that want to harness the power of so-
cial relations for incentives but, at the same time, encourage risk-taking should give thought
to (how to reduce) social risk aversion and social frictions. This idea is actually not novel. In
many developed economies, there are formal intermediaries specialized in arranging and ad-
ministering so-called friends-and-family, or social, loans. In the United States, for instance,
such intermediaries include LendFriend, Lending Karma, LoanBack, One2One Lending, Wik-
iLoan, ZimpleMoney, Prosper, Bainco, and National Family Mortgage. The key idea behind
this business is that the third-party intermediation and formalization of financial transactions
between relatives or friends safeguards those relationships, as the following advertisement
expresses:
Essentially, we provide a simple way to structure a social loan to help keep
friendships exactly as they should be—friendly. . . . We orchestrate the logistics
of the loan from behind the scenes to ensure that both the borrower and the
lender are free from the pressure that can often result from less formalized social
loans.20
A similar intermediated social finance approach could be taken to the provision of microven-
ture capital. The basic principle would be to both use social relations for incentives and
19In practice, this debate has spawned a new breed of microfinance: microventure capital. Forbes ran a
cover story on microventure capital, “Can Venture Capital Save The World?,” on December 19, 2011. Time
ran a cover story on the microfinance lenders in the US, “Can Microfinance Make It in America?,” on January
11, 2009.
20From http://www.virginmoneyus.com/Virgin_Money_Social_Loans, accessed on March 25, 2010.
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protect them by limiting downside social risks and frictions through formal intermediation.
The following is a tentative proposal:
A non-governmental organization (NGO) has a starting endowment of E. It seeks
to finance SMEs in a small village. It identifies candidate entrepreneurs, all of
whom maintain social relations in the village. Part of the endowment, E1, goes
into a village fund. By anonymous vote, the villagers rank the entrepreneurs,
and the village fund is invested into the different businesses in accordance with
the vote. The NGO complements the village investments with investments out of
the formal fund E2 = E−E1. Part of the profits that accrue to the village fund is
distributed to the villagers; the rest is used to grow the fund. Profits that accrue
to the formal fund are paid out to the NGO. Contracts, funds, and transfers
are administered by the NGO, not by the villagers. The first screening uses the
NGO’s expertise. The village vote and fund harness the social relations, respec-
tively, for information and for incentives. The anonymity of the vote, the formal
funding, and the NGO stepping in-between the village and the entrepreneurs
protect the social relations. Moreover, the villagers do not risk their existing
wealth, and there is some diversification across the village fund’s investments.
The “rents” that accrue to the villagers can be interpreted as compensation for
providing information and incentives.
6.2 Formality as innovation
Compared to the existing literature on social ties in financial contracting, which emphasizes
the benefits of social ties, our analysis focuses more on the benefits of not having to rely
on social ties, that is, the “value added” of formality. To view formality as an innovation
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is, arguably, historically correct: family finance probably preceded formal finance. Even
today, absent formal institutions, transactions primarily occur within the confines of social
relations.
Formal enforcement allows transactions with people beyond one’s immediate social sphere.
A clear benefit of this is access to more potential counterparties. In this paper, we emphasize
another key advantage of formality, one that comes out in the following quote:
Jeffrey Wolfson, a Boston attorney with a family business practice, often urges
clients to approach outside lenders before soliciting family funds. . . . By the same
token, bankers usually regard family contributions as part of the entrepreneur’s
equity—and evidence that a start-up is more than a hobby. “You don’t want to
go back to an aunt or uncle and say, ‘I lost the money,’ ” observes Carl Harris,
first vice-president at People’s Bank in Bridgeport, CT.21
Between the lines, this passage makes three noteworthy points: First, for some reason, people
deem losing a family member’s money worse than losing a bank’s (or stranger’s). Second,
this is why family finance breeds trust. Third, it is also a reason to avoid family finance.
Both our models match these points naturally. But while it is easy to see risk sharing as
an innovation of formal finance, arguing that it has evolved to avoid (social) “indebtedness”
is less obvious. Yet the evolution of formal finance much reflects this rationale. Historically,
the original norm for all loans—including formal ones—used to be personal liability.22 But
already in ancient times, there was an awareness that unlimited liability could be harmful.
Deuteronomy 15:1-2 says,23
21From http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/news/columns/98-25/e3583056.htm, accessed on March
26, 2012.
22Such personal liability could mean slavery for delinquent debtors and sometimes their entire households,
imprisonment, or even the death penalty (Levinthal, 1918).
23Asking why any lending occurred under these circumstances, Atwood (2008: 48) interestingly submits:
38
At the end of every seven years thou shalt make a release. Every creditor that
lendeth ought unto his neighbor shall release it; he shall not exact it of his
neighbor, or of his brother, because it is the Lord’s release.
Similarly, the ancient Babylonian Code of Hammurabi (117) states,
If anyone fails to meet a claim for debt, sells himself, his wife, his son, and his
daughter for money or gives them away to forced labor: they shall work for three
years . . . and in the fourth year they shall be set free.
Indeed, the roots of modern bankruptcy laws are considered to be the bankruptcy reform
Julius Caesar implemented: He allowed moneylenders to confiscate land in lieu of debt
payments but allowed a bankrupt borrower to walk away from any debt with the tools of his
trade and related lands and limited the personal liability of the borrower’s immediate and
extended family. Caesar’s express intention was that the borrower could start over, with a
clean slate, rather than waste talent in personal bondage.
Lost in the Middle Ages, this tabula rasa approach to bankruptcy reemerged during the
Enlightenment. By the 1800s, England periodically released debt prisoners and forgave their
debts. In 1833, US federal law abolished debtor prisons, which was followed by decades of
legislative bargaining about bankruptcy law. In his book on the evolution of bankruptcy
law, Skeel (2003: 26) cites a famous speech by Daniel Webster that articulates a key concern
behind this legislative process, namely, that persistent debt is counterproductive::
Sir, I verily believe that the power of perpetuating debts against debtors, for
no substantial good to the creditor himself, and the power of imprisonment for
“Probably because the lendings and borrowings took place within small communities. You didn’t have to
wipe out the debt owed to you by foreigners—only those within the group where relations with the next-door
neighbours were cradle-to-grave and tightly knit, . . . so you’d ultimately be repaid somehow for a forgiven
debt, even if it wasn’t with money.” This is to say that, socially, the obligations persisted beyond the legal
forgiveness.
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debt, at least as it existed in this country ten years ago, have imposed more
restraint on personal liberty than the law of debtor and creditor imposes in
any other Christian and commercial country. If any public good were attained,
any high political object answered, by such laws, there might be some reason
for counselling submission and sufferance to individuals. But the result is bad,
every way. It is bad to the public and to the country, which loses the effort
and the industry of so many useful and capable citizens. It is bad to creditors,
because there is no security against preferences, no principle of equality, and no
encouragement for honest, fair, and seasonable assignment of effects. As to the
debtor, however good his intentions or earnest his endeavors, it subdues his spirit
and degrades him in his own esteem.
The modern legal approach to bankruptcy, with its leniency toward debtors, marks an evo-
lution from personal bondage to limited liability. We argue that this is a key innovation that
distinguishes formal finance from family finance. With formal finance, liability is designed
by contract and enforced by law. With family finance, emotions, norms, and social pressure
define the degree of indebtedness.24 Formal finance can thus eliminate liability when social
obligations would persist and, by the same token, enforce liability when social incentives
have no bite.
In essence, we posit that formal enforcement allows for contractual designs of liability
that are more flexible than social obligations. Crucially, this argument presumes that social
obligations, unlike contractual liabilities, cannot credibly be finetuned ex ante—if this were
24The notion of debt exists as both a social and moral concept outside the legal context. Note, for example,
the wording forgive us our debt in the Lord’s Prayer, religious parables comparing sinners to debtors, and
the phrases you owe me and to pay a debt of gratitude. In certain languages (such as German), the idea is
so ingrained that the words for debt and guilt are the same (Schuld). Margaret Atwood elaborates on the
anthropological, both cultural and physical, foundations of debt as a social concept in her book Payback.
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possible, social obligations would dominate formal contracts in our model. One possible
explanation is that social frictions arise from norms and violations thereof that elicit emo-
tions, such as disappointment, anger, or indignation, that are hard—perhaps impossible—to
suppress. While this rigidity may seem to be a disadvantage, it has purpose. If emotional
reactions were contractible, they should—like contractual liabilities—be renegotiable as well.
However, this would render the threat of ex post (inefficient) social frictions an empty one,
undermining the positive ex ante effects. In other words, the rigidity of the emotional re-
actions underlying social frictions is the source of commitment. This is consistent with one
of the principal evolutionary theories of emotion in social psychology, according to which
(some) emotions have evolved as commitment devices (see Haselton and Ketelaar, 2006, and
the references therein).
6.3 Robustness
6.3.1 Social risk assumptions
The principal assumptions of the social risk model are A’s risk aversion and the altruism
between A and F . The particular specifications selected for these assumptions in Section
3, however, are not crucial. Instead of assuming that A and F internalize each other’s
realized payoff, we could assume that they internalize each other’s realized utility. A would,
if risk-averse, still experience disutility from volatility in F ’s utility, and hence prefer to sell
any risk to O. We could also assume that A and F internalize each other’s expected utility
(at time 0) though we find this less plausible. In this case, the main conclusions go through
so long as F is also risk averse and A therefore internalizes F ’s (but not O’s) disutility from
bearing risk.
This brings us to the other assumption: risk aversion. In Section 3, only A is risk averse.
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We could alternatively assume either that (i) F is also risk-averse, (ii) everyone, including
O, is risk averse, or (iii) everyone except A is risk averse. In the first case, formal finance is
superior to family finance from a risk-sharing perspective, even in the absence of altruism.
Our model rules this out in order to isolate the impact of social risk aversion. In the second
case, little changes except that F would also have a preference for A transferring risk to O
because F would be averse to risk borne by A. In the third case, social risk aversion emerges
provided that A internalizes F ’s utility. Thus, our conclusions do not rely on the assumption
that only A is risk-averse.
6.3.2 Social debt assumptions
The key assumption of the social debt model is that the altruism between A and F decreases
if A refuses to recompense F for a past shortfall through favors. This is how Section 4
specifies the fragility of friendship.
Alternatively, we could assume that the altruism is sensitive also to other decisions and
outcomes. For example, the relationship could suffer immediately upon a family loan default,
which would represent a simpler form of social friction. Another possibility is to assume
that F can see A’s project decisions and will renounce the friendship if A consumes private
benefits at F ’s expense. If sufficient, this threat creates commitment against private benefit
consumption, but it does not eliminate the possibility of social frictions following a default.
That said, if we let friendship be vulnerable only to private benefit consumption, and let
private benefit consumption be seen only by F, then we would merely assume that family
finance has a technological monitoring advantage over formal finance, with no downside.
This would amount to assuming away social frictions on the equilibrium path.
Last but not least, we could introduce actions on the part of F that relate to the financial
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transaction, such as seizing collateral or actively exerting pressure, and assume that the
friendship is vulnerable to such actions as well. This would add to the social frictions that
make family finance costly and hence reinforce our conclusions.
Again, our conclusions seem robust to alternative specifications. The crucial assumptions
are that defaults on family loans create social obligations and that the ex post fragility of
social relations cannot be finetuned ex ante, as discussed in Section 6.2.
6.3.3 Adverse selection
Our model uses moral hazard as the specific friction impeding external finance. Similar
insights, however, can be obtained in a model with adverse selection. For example, suppose
A needs external funding for a risky project but has private information about its expected
return. He can signal favorable information by retaining a larger stake in the project. The
greater the temptation to lie about the expected return, the more must A retain.
It is easy to see that A has less incentive to lie to F than to O: Because A internalizes
part of F ’s payoff, his gain from lying to her is smaller. As a result, A must retain less in
order to credibly signal information to F. At the same time, funding the project through
F, as opposed to O, forces A to internalize more social risk, or exposes him to more social
frictions. Thus, family finance is a costly signaling device, and the strength of formal finance
is that it reduces social risk and sidesteps social frictions.
7 Concluding remarks
We present two models of formal and family finance in which a family investor differs
from a formal investor only in that she has an altruistic relationship with the entrepreneur
who seeks funding, and not in her information or enforcement technology. According to
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both models, this single difference leads to benefits and costs of family finance that make
the choice—or, better, the interaction—between the two sources of finance quite interesting.
Family finance breeds trust, but it also has social ramifications that discourage risk tak-
ing. Conversely, by circumventing such ramifications, formal finance encourages risk taking.
Combining the strengths of both sources can thus be optimal in harnessing social relations
for incentives but weaving in formal intermediation to mitigate the social repercussions of
financial transactions.
We believe it is worthwhile to devise direct empirical tests of our key predictions, namely,
(i) that family finance discourages risk taking, (ii) that this happens because of aversion to
both social risk and social frictions, (iii) that defaults harm the quality of social relations,
and (iv) that formal finance alleviates these effects. In particular, it would be interesting
to study (the impact of) variations of the intermediated social finance model proposed in
Section 6.1. In the best case, this can deliver insights that help improve the provision of
microventure capital.
On the theoretical side, we have clearly left some issues unaddressed. Two strike us as
good candidates for future research. First, our model deliberately abstracts from the question
of security design, such as whether, or when, a family investor should receive debt or equity.
Robb and Robinson (2012) document that, in their Kauffman Firm Survey data, family
equity is very rare, and much more so than family debt, but, when used, often turns out to
be an important source of finance for the firm in question. We conjecture that the optimal
security design, though beyond the scope of this paper, is affected by the trade-offs discussed.
For example, in the social risk model, debt would impose less risk on family members, but
giving them equity would lead to stronger social incentives—or, if co-financing by a formal
investor is involved, a stronger certification effect.
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Second, we have yet to analyze the endogenous formation of social relationships. Again,
consider the social risk model. Having altruistic ties to multiple others allows the en-
trepreneur to spread the risk, and this could create a social “diversification” effect. If forming
a social tie is costly, an optimal number of friends, that is, network size, exists. Further-
more, our analysis suggests that improvements in the quality of formal finance—for example,
better legal enforcement or monitoring technology—should reduce the optimal network size,
since social relations become less important and hence less attractive. We think that such
effects of improved formal institutions on social network formation comprise a more general
phenomenon and may underlie various socioeconomic trends, such as the continuous decline
in family size and the trend toward living solo.
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Figures
Figure 1: Project size (I) is depicted on the vertical axis, the entrepreneur’s risk aversion
(ρ) on the bottom horizontal axis, and the formal investor’s monitoring cost (m) on the top
horizontal axis. The dotted line depicts the maximum project size under family finance as
a function of risk aversion, I¯F (ρ). The dashed line depicts the minimum project size under
formal finance as a function of monitoring cost, IO(m). Project sizes above the dotted line
but below the dashed line are capital constrained (the missing middle).
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Figure 2: Project size (I) is depicted on the vertical axis, the family investor’s wealth (W )
on the bottom horizontal axis, and the formal investor’s monitoring cost (m) on the top
horizontal axis. The solid diagonal is the 45 degree line. The dashed-dotted line depicts
the maximum project size under family finance as a function of the altruism and the family
lender’s wealth, I¯ ￿F (W ). The dashed line depicts the minimum project size under formal
finance as a function of monitoring cost, IO(m). Project sizes above the dashed-dotted line
but below the dashed line are capital constrained (the missing middle).
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